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The Bangladesh ready-made garment industry has recently been affected by a number of 
terrible accidents, with the collapse of the Rana Plaza on 24 April 2013 as the deadliest 
garment-factory accident ever known. Under the pressure of renewed attention to the role and 
responsibilities of multinational corporations (MNCs) take responsibility for what happens in 
those factories, two initiatives have been adopted. These initiatives involve leading brands of 
European origin and North-American origin. With these initiatives the MNCs claim to 
strengthen their corporate social responsibility (CSR) regarding those factories. From a 
regulatory perspective, they represent cases of transnational private regulation (TPR). 
Although CSR and TPR have become increasingly popular, these initiatives have been 
perceived with mixed enthusiasm, since they are adopted in a legal vacuum. Consequently, 
they raise questions about their legal status, their legitimacy and their implementation and 
compliance mechanisms. These same questions will be discussed in this article concerning the 
Bangladesh initiatives, in order to discern if they have the potential to contribute to improving 
safety and working conditions in the Bangladeshi garment industry, or if they are rather forms 
of window dressing. 
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The Bangladesh garment industry (or Ready-Made Garment, RMG-industry) has recently 
been affected by a number of terrible accidents, with the collapse of the Rana Plaza on 24 
April 2013, resulting in the loss of the lives of over 1,100 workers and many more injured, 
being the disastrous highlight. The Rana Plaza collapse was the deadliest garment-factory 
accident ever and has called world-wide attention to the problems the mainly female workers 
in this fast-growing industry are facing. On the one hand they need the jobs to feed their 
families but on the other hand they are confronted with unsafe and unhealthy working 
conditions, very low wages (a minimum wage of $38 and an average monthly manufacturing 
wage of $74) and long working hours. In the wake of the accidents protests have targeted the 
 
 
Bangladeshi government, calling for a higher minimum wage and for improved safety 
standards as well as their enforcement.1 
Central to this article is another issue the accidents have drawn renewed attention to: the role 
and responsibilities of multinational corporations (MNCs) that directly or indirectly place 
their orders at the Bangladeshi factories. MNCs increasingly work with Bangladeshi suppliers 
and benefit from the lax safety standards and low wages in the country to strengthen their 
price competitiveness and increase their profits. However, they are now put under increasing 
pressure by trade unions, NGO campaigns,2 the International Labour Organisation (ILO)3 and 
public opinion to take responsibility for what happens in the firms that form part of their 
supply chain. In response to these pressures, two transnational initiatives have been adopted, 
both aimed at improving the safety standards and working conditions in the garment industry 
in Bangladesh, focusing particularly on the fire and construction safety of the buildings.  
One is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh.4 The Accord is signed by a 
range of MNCs, trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The MNCs are 
largely from European origin, including large retailers and brands like Carrefour, Tesco, 
Marks and Spencer, Benetton and H&M. From the trade union side the signatories include 
two Global Union Federations (GUFs), IndustriALL Global Union and UNI Global Union, as 
well as a number of Bangladesh garment unions. NGOs Clean Clothes Campaign, Workers’ 
Rights Consortium, International Labor Rights Forum and Maquila Solidarity Network are 
witnesses to the Accord while the ILO acts as its independent chair. With the Accord the 
signatories agree to establish a fire and building safety programme in Bangladesh for a period 
of five years. 
The second initiative is the Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative of the Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety. 5  This Alliance is a company-led undertaking and comprises 
mainly North-American companies, including Gap, Wal-Mart, Sears and J.C. Penney. It aims 
to establish collaboration with labour organisations and NGOs as well as the Bangladeshi 
government and factory owners. Its goal is to improve, in the coming five years, fire and 
building safety through the development of standards, inspections, training and worker 
empowerment. 
With these initiatives the MNCs claim to strengthen their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), i.e. the responsibility of companies for the negative social, societal and environmental 
impact of their activities and for the wellbeing of their workers and the workers in supplier- 
and other companies depending on the MNCs. From a legal or regulatory perspective, they 
represent cases of transnational private regulation (TPR), i.e. regulation by private actors that 
replaces (inter-)governmental regulations or that covers new areas that have not been 
regulated by either national or international public entities before. CSR and TPR have become 
increasingly popular in the governance of transnational labour issues. Notwithstanding their 
increasing popularity, however, as will be discussed in more detail below, these initiatives 
have been perceived with mixed enthusiasm. Judgements range from ‘promising 
developments that truly aim to make a difference’6, to ‘largely window-dressing to improve 
the reputation of companies and ease the mind of the consumers’.7 One of the reasons for 
1 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-23/two-hundred-bangladesh-factories-shut-on-labor-unrest.html 




6 Cf. M.P. Thomas, Global Industrial Relations? Framework Agreements and the Regulation of International 
Labor Standards, 36:2 Labor Studies Journal, 269-287 (2011). 
7  G. Hanlon and P. Fleming, Updating the Critical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 3:6 
Sociology Compass, 937-948 (2009); and E. Sternberg, How Serious is CSR? A Critical Perspective, in C. 
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these mixed views are the questions TPR initiatives raise about their legal status, their 
legitimacy and their implementation and compliance. These same questions will be discussed 
in this article concerning the Bangladesh agreements. They will be scrutinised concerning 
their legality, their legitimacy, and their mechanisms for implementation and compliance. The 
ultimate aim is to discern if they indeed have the potential to contribute to improving safety 
and working conditions in the Bangladesh garment industry, or if they are rather forms of 
window dressing. Because of the very recent nature of the initiatives, the paper offers a 
comparative legal analysis of their potential contribution, based on their governance structures, 
actors involved, implementation and compliance mechanisms foreseen, and their substantive 
content. It is too early to discuss the actual implementation and effects of the two initiatives. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses developments in TPR and 
CSR. Section 3 further develops the concepts legality, legitimacy and implementation and 
compliance mechanisms. Section 4 analyses the two Bangladesh initiatives using these 
concepts and section 5 presents conclusions.  
 
 
2. CSR and TPR 
Central to this article are two developments that have taken place in the past decade or so. 
One is the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a key dimension of corporate 
practices, in particular of MNCs. The other is the growth of various forms of Transnational 
Private Regulation (TPR).  
Where CSR is concerned, increased attention has been paid to the role of major corporations 
in ensuring respect for human rights and decent labour standards. On the one hand this 
growing interest results from the ever-increasing weight of MNCs and their supply chains in 
the global economy and their respective (potential) influence on human rights and labour 
standards.8 On the other hand, it follows from the rising prominence of human rights and 
labour standards in the discourse of MNCs, often under the heading of CSR. 9  MNCs 
generally present these initiatives as efforts to redefine and strengthen the social and ethical 
dimensions of corporate policies and as new, socially just ways to govern both the external 
relationships and responsibilities of firms, as well as the internal relations with the workers of 
the firm. They include initiatives to strengthen respect for international labour standards; to 
improve health and safety in the workplace; to strengthen workers’ voice; and to find a better 
balance between corporate profits and workers’ well-being. Hence, CSR represents a promise 
of better rights and conditions for workers. It takes different shapes like unilateral codes of 
conduct adopted by management; international framework agreements negotiated between 
management and trade unions or works councils; or certification schemes involving multiple 
MNCs that sign up to standards that have been formulated and advocated by an non-
governmental organisation (NGO) such as ISO 26.000, SA8000 and the Ethical Trading 
Crouch and C. Maclean (eds.), The Responsible Corporation in a Global Economy (Oxford University press 
2011), at 29-54. 
8 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, 
(United Nations, 2013). 
9 This has triggered a broad interest in CSR in legal studies and especially labour law, as well as in sociology, 
business studies and political science. See e.g. J. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Limits and Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2006); C. Crouch and C. Maclean 
(eds.), The Responsible Corporation in a Global Economy (Oxford University Press 2011); E. Garriga and D. 
Melé, Corporate social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory, 53 Journal of Business Ethics, 51-71 
(2004); and regarding Bangladesh in particular: A.R. Khan, M.B. Muttakin, and J. Siddiqui, Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from an Emerging Economy, 114:2 
Journal of Business Ethics, 207-223 (2013). 
3 
IJCLL&IR, Issue 1 of 2014 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Initiative, or by submitting to the monitoring process of an NGO, like with the Fair Wear 
Foundation or the Fair Labor Association.10  
At the same time, these CSR initiatives are subject to a series of criticisms. From an orthodox 
economic perspective they are seen as unnecessary and draining resources from ‘proper’ 
business activities.11 Others are sceptical about the real motives and impact of CSR policies 
and qualify them as ‘ethical marketing devices’ and expressions of narrow business 
interests,12 or as ways of engineering new sources of legitimacy, identity and social value of 
MNCs.13 Also, CSR instruments are regarded with scepticism because of their voluntaristic 
nature and the absence of a transnational legal framework that could give such instruments a 
more formal nature and could increase their enforceability.14  
Much of the criticism of CSR has to do with the types of governance that it entails. CSR 
largely falls in the broad category of TPR. It is a rapidly growing area of experimentalist 
governance which constitutes a response to two developments: the increasingly transnational 
nature and impact of markets, services and production processes; and the difficulties national 
governments and intergovernmental organisations face in regulating this process of 
transnationalisation. TPR is argued to be able to fill this regulatory gap, to adapt rapidly to 
changes in the market, to mobilise stakeholders and to deliver expertise.15 However, TPR is 
also a heavily debated phenomenon with critics and supporters. Where weaknesses are 
concerned, TPR is often criticised for being a legally non-binding and voluntarist type of 
regulation (soft law), made by actors without any legislative or formal enforcement capacities 
and whose legitimacy is unclear, which leads to doubts about the implementation of and 
compliance with such forms of regulation. 16 Supporters rather point to the innovative and 
positive sides of TPR and highlight the potential of such experimentalist types of governance 
to fill regulatory gaps.17 Hence, CSR and TPR are subject to a series of questions which 
concern four dimensions: their legality; their legitimacy; and their implementation and 
compliance mechanisms. In the next section these four dimensions will be discussed and 
developed in more detail. 
 
 
3. Legality, legitimacy, and implementation and compliance mechanisms 
10 On these different types of CSR, see among many others: R. Pearson and G. Seyfang (eds), Corporate 
Responsibility & Labour Rights. Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy (Earthscan 2002); K. Papadakis (ed.), 
Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International Framework Agreements (ILO/Palgrave 2011); 
and A. Sobczak, Ensuring the effective implementation of transnational company agreements, 18:2 European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 139-151 (2012). 
11 E.g. Sternberg, supra n. 7. 
12 S. Banerjee, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 34:1 Critical Sociology, 51-79 
(2008). 
13 Hanlon and Fleming, supra n.7. 
14 E. Ales et al, Transnational Collective Bargaining: Past, Present and Future, Final Report for the European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2006); and M. 
Anner, The Limits of Voluntary Governance Programmes: Auditing Labor Rights in the Global Apparel Industry, 
working paper 01 ‘Project for Global Workers’ Rights’ (2011). 
15 F. Cafaggi (ed.) Enforcement of Transnational Regulation. Ensuring Compliance in a Global World, (Edward 
Elgar 2012); and F. Cafaggi, New Foundation of Transnational Private Regulation, 38:1 Journal of Law and 
Society, 20-49 (2011); and the special issue of the German Law Journal on Transnational Private Regulatory 
Governance: Regimes, Dialogue, Constitutionalization (Vol. 13, issue 12, 2012). 
16 Cafaggi 2011 supra n. 15; P. Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of 
Public Authority and Private Power, Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 45/2012. 
17 Ch. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in: D. Levi-Faur (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance (Oxford University Press 2012). 
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In this section we discuss in detail the four dimensions identified above as crucial for the 
(legal) effectiveness of CSR and TPR: legality, legitimacy and implementation and 
compliance mechanisms. These four dimension then make up the analytical framework to 





The principle of legality or lawfulness deals with the formal legal status of CSR and TPR 
initiatives. More precisely, it deals with the formal competence (the de jure authority) of the 
actors that adopt such initiatives. When actors lack de jure authority, they actually lack formal 
competence to adopt legally binding norms, which renders their initiatives without formal 
legal status, hence, leaves them legally non-binding: as soft law.18 In general only states have 
natural de jure authority to create legally binding norms through political processes. States 
can confer part of that authority to private actors like trade unions or to international 
organisations. As a result those actors posses de jure authority, albeit limited to the scope of 
the power conferred upon them. Thus, for private actors to gain de jure authority it is 
necessary that the competent national or international institutions empower them with such 
authority. However, regarding the transnational activities of MNCs both entities – states and 
international organisations – lack or have limited competences to bind MNCs to their rules or 
to transfer de jure authority on them.19 This ‘regulatory gap’ has been discussed in particular 
in the EU where the European Commission has in several occasions proposed (with no result 
yet) to create an optional legal framework for transnational collective agreements.20  
Still, in spite of the fact that MNCs and trade unions (and in particular GUFs) lack de jure 
authority to create legally binding norms, this does not mean that they operate without 
recognition. Organisations like the European Union and the ILO in many instances do 
promote and support their CSR initiatives. With that they provide these initiatives with de 
facto authority, i.e. recognition of competence and power in practice. Nonetheless, these 
initiatives remain voluntary in nature, which has raised doubts about their credibility and 




18 M.A. García-Muñoz Alhambra, B.P. ter Haar and A. Kun, Soft on the Inside, Hard on the Outside: An 
Analysis of the Legal Nature of New Forms of International Labour Law, 27:4 The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 337-363 (2011). 
19 National norms can at best have extra-territorial effect or extended territorial effect. However, with the 
exception of some compelling examples with regard to market access and environmental issues in the context of 
the European Union, this is (still) limited, at least for labour standards. See more elaborately about this issue: J. 
Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62:1 American Journal of Comparative Law 
(forthcoming 2014); and K van Wezel Stone, Labor and the global economy: four approaches to transnational 
labor regulation, 16 Michigan Journal of International Law, 987-1028 (1994-1995). On the limitations of 
international organisations, see: Y. Kryvoi, Enforcing Labor Rights against Multinational Corporate Groups in 
Europe, 46:2 Industrial Relations, 366-386 (2007). 
20 See e.g. R. Zimmer, Establish a legal framework for transnational collective agreements in Europe: a difficult 
task, 02/2012 Final report EUROACTA (chapter 2); I. Schönmann et al, Transnational collective bargaining at 
company level. A new component of European industrial relations. (ETUI 2012); A. Lo Faro Bargaining in the 
shadow of ‘optional frameworks’? The rise of transnational collective agreements and EU law, 18:2 European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 153-165 (2012). 
21 C. Crouch, Collective bargaining and transnational corporations in the global economy, 1:2 International 
Journal of Labour Research, 43-60 (2012). 
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Whereas the principle of legality is, among other things, concerned with the formal 
competence of the actors involved with the adoption of TPR (de jure authority), the principle 
of legitimacy is concerned with the competence or power of the actors as accepted in practice 
by those that are affected by those initiatives (de facto authority). In other words, it deals with 
the more political or sociological interpretation of the authority to adopt norms, which can 
only be as effective as this authority is accepted in practice. When authority is constructed by 
a legal framework (de jure), it implies also obedient behaviour, whereas obedient behaviour in 
practice could construct de facto authority.22 Three broad approaches can be discerned by 
which de facto authority can be created or enhanced: (i) building on existing norms and 
standards; (ii) through hierarchical relationships between the actors involved; and (iii)  
creating inclusive governance structures that include as many relevant stakeholders as 
possible. 
The first approach, building on existing norms and standards, is considered to enhance de 
facto authority in CSR because it indicates that they are not just randomly chosen standards, 
rather they are developed by organisations that have de jure and/or de facto authority. Many 
CSR initiatives indeed do build upon labour standards that are defined either by international 
organisations like the ILO (core labour standards), the OECD (MNC guidelines) and UN 
Global Compact (ten principles), or by NGOs, including ISO26.000, SA8000, Fair Labor 
Association, Fair Wear Foundation or Clean Clothes Campaign.23 In recent years, there is a 
tendency of convergence of these standards since many of them refer to each other. Moreover, 
most of these standards directly or indirectly refer to the standards of the ILO, in particularly 
the right of association and collective bargaining, the abolition of forced and child labour, and 
equal treatment. Besides these core labour rights it is not uncommon that the issue of health 
and safety at work is included.24 
Secondly, de facto authority can depend upon the power relationships between the actors 
involved in the adoption and implementation of the CSR initiative. This concerns especially 
power relations between MNCs and their supply chains (including subsidiaries, suppliers, 
subcontractors, licensees etc.) and, on the employees’ side, between GUFs and lower levels of 
unions or other workers representation bodies. In the social-economic literature this 
relationship is often expressed by the level of asymmetry of power between actors. The higher 
the power asymmetry, the more hierarchical the relationship and the more likely it is that the 
authority of a lead-company over its supply chain or of a GUF over other unions and workers’ 
representatives is accepted.25  
The level of power asymmetry or hierarchy between the lead-company and its supply chain 
can be expressed by the governance structure characterising their relationship.26 In general 
high levels of power asymmetry are characterised by a culture of centralised decision making 
on business policies by the lead company that is executed by its subsidiaries, suppliers, 
subcontractors etc. Low levels of power asymmetry on the other hand are characterised by 
22 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/; see also: see also: C. Ku and P.F. Diehl, International Law. 
Classic and Contemporary Readings. (Rienner 2003), at 41-44. 
23 R. Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power. Promoting Labor standards in a Global Economy, 
Cambridge University Press 2013), at 178-179; and L. Fransen, Corporate Social Responsibility and Global 
Labor Standards. Firms and Activists in the Making of Private Regulation, (Routledge 2012). 
24 K. Papadakis (ed.), Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International Framework Agreements 
(Palgrave MacMillan 2011) for IFAs in particular; and B.P. ter Haar, Love, Flirt or Repel: Hybrid global 
governance of the ILO core labour standards, European Journal of Social Law (forthcoming), more general. 
25 This is our interpretation and elaboration of the governance types as identified by G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey, 
and T. Sturgeon, The governance of global value chains, 12:1 Review of International Political Economy, 78-
104 (2005); and the functional profiles as defined by T. Müller, H-W Platzer, and S. Rüb, Global Union 
Federations and the Challenges of Globalisation, International Policy Analysis (2010)..  
26 Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, supra n. 25. See also: Khan, Badrul Muttakin, and Siddiqui, supra n. 7. 
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independent businesses working together as equal partners in non-hierarchical networks. 
Research in this field indicates that in general there is a tendency moving away from strong 
hierarchical structures towards non-hierarchical network structures. 27  Consequently, the 
natural de facto authority of the lead company over its chain is declining and weakening. 
Similarly, the internal relationship between the GUFs and the affiliated national and local 
trade unions can be expressed.28 Research in this field indicate that most of the GUFs used to 
be characterised as decentralised networks in which the GUF functioned as secretariat and 
information platform. During the last decade though, most of the relationships between the 
GUFs and their affiliates have become more hierarchical in which setting the GUFs have been 
empowered with competences to coordinate objectives and provide guidance on how to 
achieve those objectives, and in some occasions GUFs have the power to adopt binding 
decisions that standardise operational objectives.29 Despite this increase of the level of power 
asymmetry, in general GUFs too lack a natural de facto authority over their affiliates.30  
A third approach to enhance de facto authority is by involving as many relevant stakeholders 
as possible in the adoption and/or implementation of CSR initiatives. The involvement of 
stakeholders can be achieved by the creation of governance structures or networks based on a 
relationship of trust, co-operation and continuous negotiation/dialogue. In such networks 
relationships between actors are not, or only to a limited extent, hierarchical and free from any 
form of constitutional ordering, meaning that the actors involved engage freely (voluntarily) 
with one another across national borders. 31  Also, legitimacy increases as the number of 
relevant stakeholders that are actively involved with the adoption, implementation and 
monitoring of the initiative grows. 
 
3.3 Implementation and compliance mechanisms 
Early attempts of MNCs to promote labour rights were faced with an unprecedented challenge, 
since they could not draw from experiences of their peers and had to experiment. Operating 
under uncertainty, the definition of general and open standards has proven to be a safe start, 
creating enough flexibility to define the scope and meaning of the norms according to what 
was achievable in practice. Also, it left enough room for civil society organisations to 
scrutinise the practice of MNCs. These early experiences made it clear that setting fixed rules 
and standards, and relying on traditional command and control structures for implementation 
and compliance thereof would not suffice, especially because often not hierarchical.32   
And a variety of other obstacles concerning the effectiveness of CSR have emerged from 
research. One is that at the lower-levels of the supply chain the capabilities to implement 
norms properly are often limited. Hence, non-compliance is not necessarily a matter of will 
but also a matter of being able to. Another is that monitoring of implementation by means of 
financial-style audits, i.e. based on a long list of items to be inspected and verified. Such 
27 Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, supra n. 25, at 90-96. See also: M. Fichter and J. Sydow, Using Networks 
Towards Global Labor Standards? Organizing Social responsibility in Global Production Chains, 9:4 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 357-380 (2002. 
28 E.g. Müller, Platzer, and Rüb, supra n. 25, at 3 (table 1). 
29 Ibid.  
30 See for similar conclusions: P. Fairbrother and N. Hammer, Global Unions: Past Efforts and Future Prospects, 
60:3 Industrial Relations, 205-431 (2005); and more generally on transnational trade unionism: P. Fairbrother, 
M-A Hennebert and Ch. Lévesque (eds.), Transnational Trade Unionism. Building Union Power. (Routledge 
2013).  
31 G. de Búrca, R.O. Keohane, and Ch. Sabel, New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance, 45:1 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (2013). 
32 Cf. Locke, supra n. 23, at 46-77 (which covers Chapter 3 Does Private Compliance Improve Labor Standard? 
Lessons from Nike).  
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audits are primarily based on factory records which are non-transparent and unreliable.33 Also, 
suppliers or subcontractors can develop ‘audit fatigue’, in particular when they work for 
multiple lead companies which each have their own set of norms and monitoring schemes. 
Related to the latter is also the issue of monitoring manageability. Global supply chain 
networks span not only multiple countries around the world, they can also include very large 
numbers of suppliers and subcontractors, up to 1,000 or in some cases even to 10,000.34 
Consequently, simplifying strategies are needed to bring monitoring back into manageable 
proportions, for instance by focussing on the suppliers and subcontractors a real difference 
can be made or with which the MNC has close, cooperative relationships.35 One way of 
selecting such suppliers and subcontractors is by dividing them into first, second, third, etc. 
tier-factories, i.e., by their distance to the lead company, and to emphasise the monitoring of 
suppliers and subcontractors that are closest related to the respective MNC since it is here that 
the lead company can be expected to have the highest impact.  
In light of these obstacles and challenges, case studies show that a shift in emphasis is taking 
place in CSR policies from the detailed formulation of the norms – the normative quality of 
the substance – towards procedures supporting implementation and compliance.36 Hence, the 
adoption of a CSR initiative ‘does not mark the end of the negotiation process, but rather the 
starting point of an organizational learning process throughout the subsidiaries’.37 The latter 
than comprises experiments with the exchange of good practices, capability building (training 
of management and workers and their representatives), continuous deliberation between 
stakeholders and the development of preventive measures. In regulatory terms, this shift 
qualifies as a move away from conventional command and control mechanisms that stress 
enforcement and compliance with fixed rules, towards proactive problem-solving that 
emphasizes the operation of multi-level networks and aims for preventive actions. The latter 
then stress the importance of experimentation and deliberation in order to internalise open-
ended standards. 38  This tendency is in pace with the developments witnessed regarding 
legitimacy discussed above: from hierarchical principle agent governance structures towards 
non-hierarchical multi-centred governance modes. Consequently, the focus in these initiatives 
is becoming more sophisticated including conventional forms of norm-setting combined with 
(semi-)judicial review, and forms of experimental governance.  
Furthermore, these forms of governance are characterised by the construction of hybrid 
structures with other modes of governance, that are either private or public of origin and stem 
from different regulatory levels (national, regional/supranational or international). In this 
context there are several authors that stress the need for in particular private-public 
constructions. 39 They argue that this would not only enhance de facto authority but also 
33  Ibid, at 35-39; D. O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor 
Standards and Monitoring, 31:1 The Policy Studies Journal, 1-29 (2003); and Ch. Sabel, D. O’Rourke, and A. 
Fung, Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the global Workplace, KSG 
Working Paper No. 00-010 (2000). 
34 Fichter and Sydow, supra n. 28, at 368-369. 
35 Ibid, at 357-380. 
36 E.g. Sobczak, supra n. 10. 
37 Ibid. This is supported by many others, among which: Locke, supra n. 23 and Fichter and Sydow, supra n 28. 
38 A tendency that is in particular apparent with the implementation and monitoring mechanisms developed and 
applied by NGOs: O’Rourke supra n. 43; and L. Fransen and B. Burgoon, Global Labour-Standards Advocacy 
by European Civil Society Organizations: Trends and Developments, British Journal of Industrial Relations 
(early online publication 2013); and concerning IFAs: D. Stevis, The Impacts of International Framework 
Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler case, in K. Papadakis (ed.), ‘Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The 
Impact of International Framework Agreements’ (ILO/Palgrave MacMillan 2011), at 116-142. 
39 Locke supra n. 23; and M. Weiss, International Labour Standards: a Complex Public-Private Policy Mix, 
29:1 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 7-19 (2013). 
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strengthen compliance mechanisms since it could open paths to legally binding norms and/or 
judicial review by (national) courts.  
 
 
4. Bangladesh Agreements 
With the rising number of tragic accidents, societal pressure for change in the garment 
industry in Bangladesh has resulted in several initiatives. These include initiatives of public 
origin as well as private (see figure 1). Among them (marked grey in the figure) are the two 
private CSR initiatives that are under analysis in this paper: the ‘Accord on Fire and Building 
Safety in Bangladesh’ (further: the Accord) and the ‘Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative of 
the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety’ (further: the Initiative).  
 





4.1 Analysis of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
The ‘Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh’ was the first private agreement to be 
adopted after the Rana Plaza collapse, namely at 13 May 2013. This is merely three weeks 
later which is a remarkably short time given the fact that the conclusion of agreements 
involving multi-stakeholders is a complex process concerned with the alignment of different 
and sometimes conflicting interests. That it only took about three weeks is because the Accord 
is in fact a ‘rename’ of an agreement that was signed on 20 September 2012 by two MNCs 
(the German chain Tchibo and PvH/Tommy Hillfiger) with the GUF IndustriAll Global 
Union and four NGOs – Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), International Labor Rights Forum 
(ILRF), Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) and Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), together 
40 See for further information about these initiatives: http://www.industriall-union.org/tchibo-joins-agreement-
on-garment-factory-safety-in-bangladesh (Agreement Tchibo and PvH/Tommy Hillfiger); 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-
dhaka/documents/genericdocument/wcms_209285.pdf (tripartite NAP Bangladesh); http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-667_en.htm (Global Sustainability Compact); http://betterwork.org/global/?p=3694 (Better work 
programme ILO and IFC); 
http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Informationresources/Publicinformation/Pressreleases/WCMS_226720/lang--
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with several Bangladeshi trade unions and labour rights groups.41 This agreement had not 
taken effect yet because it needed at least two more MNCs to sign up to it to initiate its 
activities. Unfortunately two more tragic accidents were needed in order for other MNCs to 
join the agreement. At the moment of the ‘re-launch’ of the agreement by the name of Accord, 
24 MNCs had signed to it. It remained open for more MNCs to join which has resulted in over 
a hundred MNCs signing the Accord.42 These MNCs are largely from European origin. On 
the workers’ side, IndustriAll Global Union is joined by UNI Global Union and also national 
trade unions affiliated to IndustriAll Global Union have co-signed the Accord.43 The Accord 
is endorsed by the earlier involved NGOs who have signed as witness and is supported by 
public organisations, including the OECD national contact points, 44  the European 
Commission,45 and in several ways by the ILO. 
In brief the Accord aims to improve the fire and building safety by safety inspections. By the 
inspection defined risks need to be remediated, for which financial support will be raised by 
the signatory companies and others. Factory managers, workers and security staff will be 
trained to enable them to voice concerns and to actively participate in activities to ensure their 
own safety. The Accord covers a five-year period. 
 
Legality and legitimacy 
The Accord deals with fire and building safety in Bangladeshi RMG-Industry which are part 
of the supply chain of the signatory MNCs. Since the Accord is adopted by private actors only 
it qualifies as TPR. The Accord states that the Accord is legally-binding, however, since it is a 
form of CSR by TPR, it lacks per definition a legal framework to give it a formal legally-
binding status, hence it lacks de jure authority.  
From a regulatory point of view, the following can be noticed with respect to the legally-
binding status it is claimed to have. Being an agreement between MNCs and GUFs and 
national trade unions, it can be binding based on contract law. This means that it is only 
binding between the parties and regarding the obligations and rights that apply to them. For as 
far as rights and obligations are concerned for third-parties, in this situation the individual 
workers and the supplier factories, the Accord cannot create de jure legally-binding norms. 
However, this does not mean that it cannot create legal facts, in particular when authority to 
create norms for third-parties is accepted in de facto. As suggested in section three, in many 
cases governance relations between MNCs and their supply chain, and between GUFs and 
their affiliates are not very hierarchical, include limited levels of power asymmetry and hence 
a limited level of natural de facto authority.  
Concerning the Accord this problem is partly solved with regard to the governance 
relationship between the GUFs involved, in particular IndustriAll, and their national 
Bangladeshi affiliates. Firstly, IndustriAll is, according to Müller, Platzer and Rüb, one of the 
few GUFs that has developed in the direction of steering body, implying a relatively strong de 
facto authority over its affiliates. Secondly, the relevant Bangladeshi trade unions have co-
signed the Accord and are therefore directly bound by the Accord. This does not apply to the 
question of de facto authority of MNCs towards their Bangladeshi suppliers. Still, the Accord 
does address legitimacy in several ways. 
41 Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety Agreement http://www.industriall-union.org/tchibo-joins-agreement-on-
garment-factory-safety-in-bangladesh.  
42 http://www.industriall-union.org/bangladesh-signatory-list 
43 These are: the National Garments Workers Federation (NGWF), Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers 
Union Federation (BIGUF), plus the Bangladesh Independent Garments Workers Federation (BIGWF) and 
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The first way to strengthen legitimacy (and therewith de facto authority) is through the 
promotion of norms and standards defined by other, more authoritative, organisations and 
initiatives. The Accord deals with fire and building safety that is part of the issue of health 
and safety at work and which is promoted by the NGOs that signed the Accord as witness and 
the ILO that supports the Accord in several ways. One of the ways the ILO supports the 
Accord is with a special programme on working conditions, including health and safety (see 
figure 1 above).  
Secondly, a substantial part of the Accord deals with governance structures to ensure its 
implementation. It creates several bodies, of which the steering committee and the advisory 
body are the most important ones. Both include the main stakeholders: the steering committee 
includes representatives of the signatory MNCs and the trade unions; the advisory body 
covers a considerably wider range of stakeholders, including the Bangladeshi government, 
national trade unions, supplier representatives, MNC representatives and representatives of 
national and international NGOs. The ILO is involved in both as independent chair. The 
steering committee is responsible for the execution of the Accord, whilst the Advisory Body 
foresees the former with input and feedback. Hence the Advisory Body’s main aim is to 
ensure a constructive dialogue among all stakeholders (article 6 of the Accord). Via both 
bodies network structures are created which enhance the de facto authority of the Accord. 
Furthermore, these bodies not only create governance structures between the stakeholders, 
they also signal a multi-centred coordination process. Not only is there a wide variety of 
stakeholders involved with the adoption of the Accord, but also with its implementation.  
 
Implementation and compliance mechanisms 
The above aspects, in particular the creation of governance structures that include multiple 
stakeholders and a multi-centred coordination process, emerge from the literature as essential 
for the creation of auditing and training systems that uses mutually recognised incentives and 
sanctions. The Accord also has a well-designed architecture for implementation and 
compliance. First of all, it defines a clever ‘monitoring strategy’: articles 1-3 of the Accord 
define the personal scope by connecting the intensity of inspections and level of remediation 
requirements to the production volumes of the supplier factories for the signatory MNCs. By 
dividing the supplier factories in Tier 1, 2 and 3, respectively high to low production volumes, 
it not only brings the inspections back into manageable numbers, but it also focuses on 
supplier factories that are more likely to make a substantial difference in the Bangladeshi 
RMG-Industry. A qualified, independent Safety Inspector will conduct inspections in the Tier 
1, 2 and 3 factories. Based on the reports of the safety inspector – which are disseminated 
among the stakeholders and partly made public – remediation measures need to be taken by 
the supplier factory. The inspection norms will be based on the Bangladesh tripartite national 
action plan46 and further developed in co-operation with the Bangladeshi government. The 
signatory MNCs are made responsible for their supplier factories to comply. Therefore they 
can use incentives (mainly financial support and the guarantee of orders for at least the 
duration of the Accord, which is five years) and sanctions (via a warning system ultimately 
resulting in the termination of the business relationship) (articles 21-25 of the Accord). The 
Accord also foresees in a training programme on fire and building safety to be established by 
a Training Coordinator. The training will be offered for workers, managers and security staff 
of Tier 1 factories. Local trade unions and specialised staff are to be involved. The aim of this 
training is to enable workers to voice concerns and participate in activities to ensure their own 
46 Which was adopted in March 2013: http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Informationresources/WCMS_209285/lang--
en/index.htm.  
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safety, preferably via Health and Safety Committees that function in accordance with 
Bangladeshi law.  
Although the Accord is adopted in order to fix a problem (reactive), the just described 
mechanisms show more resemblance with the pro-active problem solving actions using 
experimentation and deliberation to internalise open-ended standards. The Accord also 
provides more traditional command-control structures. The first is the use of a hotline for 
workers to alert the Safety Inspectors about health and safety risks (article 18 of the Accord). 
More significantly, article 5 of the Accord provides for a dispute resolution ‘between the 
parties to, and arising under, the terms’ of the Accord. The dispute resolution knows two 
instances: the steering committee and a binding arbitration process based on the New York 
Convention. An arbitration award is enforceable in a court of law of the domicile of the 
signatory against whom enforcement is sought. The latter is unique and unprecedented in 
CSR (or TPR) initiatives. The fact that the signatory parties are willing to submit their actions 
to binding third party dispute resolution enhances the credibility significantly and 
consequently the effectiveness of the Accord. Hence, it is argued that this provision was the 
main reason for many North-American based MNCs not to sign the Accord out of fear for 
risking excessive undefined legal liability.47 This is in particular the case when article 5 is 
read in conjunction with article 20, which provides in the establishment of a protocol that i) 
supports and motivates the employer to take remediation efforts in the interest of the 
workforce and the sector and ii) expedite prompt legal action where the supplier refuses to 
undertake the remedial action required to become compliant with national law.  
To conclude, the Accord applies a mixture of traditional command and control mechanisms 
combined with experimentalist pro-active problem-solving mechanisms. Together they 
construct credible mechanisms for effective implementation of the Accord. 
 
 
4.2 Analysis legal dimension Bangladesh Workers Safety Initiative 
The ‘Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative’ of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety 
dates from 10 July 2013.48 It recognises that the individual CSR efforts of the allied MNCs 
have not resulted into safe enough working circumstances. Therefore a collective effort is 
required, to which end the Alliance is founded and the Initiative is launched. The twenty 
MNCs that joined the Alliance are of North-American origin. The Alliance is supported by 
several (mainly North-American) employers’ associations and by BRAC49 (an international 
NGO founded in Bangladesh). Furthermore, it seeks cooperation with other interested parties 
and key-stakeholders, among which the Bangladeshi government, RMG-Industry and its 
workers, as well as other international organisations. 
The Initiative of the Alliance is a five-year programme to improve factory safety by means of 
inspections, safety training for factory management and workers (both activities are 
monitored by a third party) and a ‘hotline’ to empower workers to report safety concerns. The 
programme is supported by a financial fund and provided with access to substantial low-cost 
capital for factory improvements.  
 
Legality and Legitimacy 
The Initiative deals with safety of the factories in the Bangladeshi RMG-Industry that are 
suppliers of the signatory MNCs. As such it qualifies as a form of TPR. In the introduction of 
47  B. Hensler and J. Blasi (2013), ‘Making Global Corporations’ Labor Rights Commitments Legally 
Enforceable: The Bangladesh Breakthrough’, Worker Rights Consortium.  
48 http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/  
49 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
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the Initiative it is stated that it is a legally binding commitment among the founding Alliance 
members. This means that it is only binding between the signatory MNCs, and hence does not 
aim to attribute legally binding rights that can be claimed by for instance the workers covered 
by the Initiative against the signatory MNCs. Consequently, the legal bindingness of the 
Initiative is clearly limited to claims between the signatory MNCs in order to keep each other 
equally committed to the programme. This involves in particular commitments concerning 
contributions to the worker safety fund and sharing of information on the factories the MNCs 
use and the safety inspection reports concerning those factories. Actions on claims of non-
compliance can be brought for arbitration either in New York or in Toronto (article 
5(1)(a)(vii) of the Alliance Bylaw). Although with its limits, this is an important aspect. The 
case study of Robertson on the effectiveness of the Chiquita IFA, for instance, has illustrated 
the vulnerability and risk of failing of TPR when a significant part of the market actors is not 
committed.50  
Secondly, even though it is claimed to be legally binding for the signatory MNCs only, the 
Initiative does create rights and obligations for Bangladeshi supply factories and their workers. 
When reading the Initiative it gives the impression that it relies on a presumed hierarchical 
internal governance structure between the MNC and its suppliers – the provisions in the 
Initiative consequently address either the Alliance or the Alliance Members (i.e. the MNCs). 
However, such governance structures are rare in the garment industry, therefore, if the 
Initiative is to be taken as a credible attempt to improve the factory safety it ought to include 
mechanisms to enhance natural de facto authority.  
Regarding the subject matter of the Initiative, it can be noted that factory safety is part of 
health and safety at work, which is the subject of many an initiative of NGOs and the ILO. 
However, these organisations are not as intensively involved in the Initiative as they are in the 
Accord. For example, no reference is made to any of the initiatives of these organisations. 
Moreover, none of these organisations nor the Bangladeshi government have a guaranteed 
formal position or representation in the governance bodies that are established to execute the 
Initiative. The Board of Directors is composed of four company representatives and four 
stakeholder representatives and an elected chair. The stakeholder representatives could be 
NGOs and/or the ILO, but can also be anyone else with qualifications in the areas of workers 
safety, human rights or labour (article 5(2)(d)(ii) of the Alliance Bylaw). Consequently, quite 
different from the Accord, the core group of stakeholders involved in the adoption as well as 
the implementation of the Initiative concerns mainly the allied MNCs. Moreover, little effort 
is made to strengthen de facto authority by broadening the range of actors involved, either in 
the governance of the Initiative or in its implementation. As a result, certain key stakeholders 
have a limited role or are simply absent. For example, there is no mentioning of the 
involvement of trade unions or other of workers’ representatives. As a result, the Initiative 
remains weak in its de facto authority. 
 
Implementation and compliance mechanisms 
Although the content of the Initiative is very similar to that of the Accord in terms of activities 
to be promoted – inspections, remediation and training for factory workers and management – 
from a regulatory point of view they differ considerably. Whilst the Accord pays much 
attention to governance and implementation mechanisms, the Initiative focuses on the 
formulation of norms and on things that at some point ‘will be done’. For example, the 
Initiative states that the Alliance will appoint a Training Committee to develop a uniform set 
50 P.K. Robinson, International Framework Agreements: Do Workers Benefit in a Global Banana Supply Chain? 
in K. Papadakis (ed.), ‘Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International Framework 
Agreements’ (ILO/Palgrave MacMillan 2011), at 164-178. 
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of fire and building safety educational standards. When a factory fails an inspection it is 
required to take the training programme within 30 days. This sounds reasonable, however, the 
same section of the Initiative immediately continues to state that Alliance members (thus the 
MNCs) ‘have pledged to work only with factories that ensure a safe working environment’ 
and that they have committed ‘not to source from any factory that the members find is unsafe’. 
Furthermore, regarding the remediation of unsafe situations, the Alliance ‘will develop a 
process for validation and accountability’. Although this seems fair, from a regulatory point of 
view this means that norms will be set that the factories have to comply with (command and 
control approach). It leaves little room for a process in which the supplier company can 
gradually improve the safety situation by learning, by identifying the underlying problems, 
and by developing the necessary capabilities (through increased knowledge and understanding 
as well as financial means) to tackle these problems (problem solving approach).  
Similar to the Accord, the Initiative also provides financial support for the factories to 
remediate unsafe situations as identified in the safety reports. However, the focus lies on the 
obligations of the MNCs to contribute, rather than on creating financial incentives for supplier 
factories to participate in the programme, even though the Initiative recognises the difficulties 




This article presents a comparative analysis of two initiatives that have been adopted in 
response to a series of accidents in the Bangladeshi RMG-Industry, with the collapse of the 
Rana Plaza at 24 April 2013 as disastrous highlight. The first is the Accord, adopted by 
mainly European MNCs jointly with two GUFs and a series of national trade unions, and the 
second the Initiative, launched by an Alliance of mainly North-American MNCs. With these 
two initiatives the MNCs involved respond to the pressure from society and workers in the 
Bangladeshi RGM-Industry to take their social responsibility, hence these initiatives are a 
form of CSR. Since these initiatives are adopted by private actors and have a transnational 
scope, they also qualify as TPR. Hence, they raise questions about their nature and 
effectiveness: are they business driven ‘ethical marketing devices’ (window-dressing) or are 
they serious human rights driven efforts to redefine and strengthen the social and ethical 
dimensions of corporate policies? And, from a legal point of view, considering that these 
initiatives are legally non-binding and voluntarist types of regulation (soft law), do they have 
the potential to effectively address the fire and construction safety problems in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry?  
What stands out regarding both initiatives is that they have both been adopted in a rather short 
period of time after the disastrous collapse of Rana Plaza – the Accord within three weeks and 
the Initiative within 14 weeks. Something that would not have been possible when the route 
of public measures would have been taken, that is, if there would have been a public regulator 
on the transnational level. Secondly, what positively distinguishes these initiatives from most 
other CSR initiatives is that they involve a substantial number of market-leading MNCs and 
cover a substantial part of the Bangladeshi supplier factories active in the garment industry 
(somewhere between 35% to 50%). 
When comparing the two initiatives on the four dimensions they differ considerably. It is 
inherent to the TPR nature of both initiatives that they lack legality or de jure authority. This 
can partly be compensated for by legitimacy or de facto authority and effective 
implementation and compliance mechanisms. The Accord seems to better accomplish this 
than the Initiative. Indeed the Initiative relies on traditional command and control mechanism 
and monitoring by means of financial-style auditing, with little attention for the capabilities of 
the Bangladeshi factories and workers to identify and address problems, or the dangers of 
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unreliable or false information supplied to audits. As such, it shows strong resemblance with 
the early period unilateral CSR codes which were often not very successful in practice. Hence, 
the setup of the Initiative seems to limit its potential effectiveness from the outset. 
The Accord on the other hand provides an interesting mix of traditional command and control 
mechanisms, especially the arbitration procedure, and forms of experimentalist governance. 
The emphasis is on developing the capabilities of the factories and workers, and on 
constructive deliberation with all relevant stakeholders, including the Bangladeshi 
government, trade unions and NGOs. The Accord accommodates therefore many aspects that 
have been indicated in the literature as contributing positively to the effectiveness of the CSR 
and TPR. The setup of the Accord therefore is more promising as to its expected effectiveness 
in practice and in making a difference where the improvement of fire and construction safety 
is concerned. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating and it will depend on the 
actual use actors make of the two, still very recent, initiatives which one will be most 
effective in the end. The Accord however seems to offer the best architecture and instruments 
in this sense and seems most likely to offer a real step forward.  
Finally, some shortcomings of both initiatives should be pointed out. First, although the 
initiatives have no intention to be rivals or to fight for dominance, they are also not 
complementary. They just coexist. This overcomplicates the situation, especially for the 
supplier factories, whose suppliers relations are often not limited to factories that have signed 
up to only one of the initiatives. Consequently they could be confronted with confluence of 
obligations and processes following from both initiatives. Even when this would be 
forestalled with determination rules, it remains sub-optimal since two different sets of 
standards and incentives are set. Another negative aspect is the temporal limitation of five 
years. Although is admirable that the aim of the initiatives is to remediate the unsafe fire and 
building situations within a period of five years, considering the magnitude of the problems it 
is unlikely that this can be achieved in such a short period. Also, it remains unclear what 
happens after those five years: will the actors involved learn lessons, adjust the content and 
renew the initiatives for another period of five years? Or will they be abandoned if the 
pressure from public opinion and workers has lessened?  
Finally, the major limitation of both initiative is their material scope. Both only address the 
issue of fire and building safety and even though this is a major issue that indeed needs urgent 
attention, the workers in the Bangladeshi garment industry are also confronted with very low 
wages, bad working conditions, minimal employment and social security and severely limited 
voice. One wonders what has to happen for MNCs to accept their corporate social 
responsibility on these equally important and urgent issues as well and to more 
comprehensively start to guarantee decent work for all. 
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